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C.: Rules of Court Limiting the Time Within Which Pleas May Be Filed
EDITORIAL NOTES

them [the landowners] of their privilege to reduce to possession,"
if this means that the state can prohibit one landowner from draining oil or gas from the land of others, it is submitted the decisions
are unsound. Whether the use of gas compressors and pumps
actually has the effect suggested by these cases may be somewhat
doubted. Assuming, however, that there is such a result where
there are the geological formations found in Indiana, it by no
means follows that the same thing would be true in West Virginia
or Oklahoma, where the gas may be found in different geological
formations. Hence, it would seem that unless the adjoining landowner can show that the use of gas compressors and pumps actually
does result in the needless waste of this mineral, he should have
no right to object to the use of artificial devices to increase the
flow of gas from the wells. It is further submitted that while the
state legislature may regulate production of gas so as to conserve
the mineral and prevent its needless waste, it has no power to
forbid the use of artificial means of increasing the flow either of
oil or gas so long as the result is merely to exhaust the mineral
---J. W. S.
beneath the land and not to waste it.
RuLEs OF COURT LIIITNG THE Tmni WTEmN WHICH PL S M&Y
BE Fum.-In Teter v. George,1 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia had occasion to construe the following rule of court
promulgated and applied by one of the circuit courts of the State:
"No pleadings, notices or counterclaims shall be filed in
court, in any case, later than the fifth day before the day in
which the ase is set for trial-on the docket, except pleas of the
'general issue' and 'general replication,' unless otherwise expressly provided by law. * * * * * Any failure to observe this
rule shall be deemed a waiver of all rights to plead, demur,
amend, file any counterclaim or set-off, or otherwise object to
the pleadings in the ease." 2
The defendant had filed his "general plea", presumably the general issue, at a term of court held in January, 1919, and the case
was set for trial at the following May term. The defendant, less
than five days before the date specified on the docket for trial of
the case, tendered and asked leave to file a special plea and a notice
of set-offs. The trial court refused to fie the plea or notice, holding
1 103 S. E. 275

(W. Va. 1920).

2 b.d., 277.
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that the fact that the actual trial date had been postponed several
days on account of exigencies of the trial docket did not shift forward the time limit beyond which, by force of the rule, such pleas
or notices could not be filed. The Supreme Court held the rule to
be a reasonable and valid regulation of practice and approved the
interpretation placed upon it.
Unless this decision be subjected to careful scrutiny and strictly
confined to the limits justified by the facts of the case, it is believed
that it may lead to unwarranted conclusions. The Supreme Court
is careful to say that such a rule of court can not contravene
"positive law" nor the "organic or statutory law." Presumably
(and it would seem properly) it is intended to include the common
law within the term "positive. law". Hence the sole question involved is whether the rule of court is in conflict with any existing
positive law.
It is submitted that the rule does not, and can not, apply except in an instance where (in the language of the rule) "the case
is set for trial on the docket." In other words, the case must
be on the trial docket and not on the office judgment docket. It
must be set for trial of an issue, and not merely for execution of
an order of inquiry of damages. Such an interpretation is implied
by the literal language of the rule, and, as we shall see later, the
positive law requires it. There can be no trial without an issue of
fact, and no issue of fact without a plea. Hence, in order for a
case to be "set for trial," so that the rule may operate, it must be
understood that some plea-usually the general issue-has already
been filed in the case, and that the restriction in the rule relates
exclusively to the time of filing additional pleas, a thing which is
closely analogous to, if not the same as, making an amendment.
Consequently, it is logical to suppose that, in the absence of a
statutory restriction, a trial court is vested with a large measure
of discretion as to the time within which additional pleas may be
filed.' As to such pleas, the rule may be valid; but it is believed
3 "The position in which a case first presents itself for action in court is
either on the office judgment docket, when no plea has been filed at rules, or on the
issue docket, when a plea has been filed. In the latter case, additional or amended pleas may be presented in term; and in the former, the judgment rendered
in the office may be set aside and the proper pleas filed." 1 BARTON, LAW PIACTICE, 484.
"There is no time fixed by law at which new or additional pleas may be filed;
but the practice is, upon setting aside the office judgment, in addition to the
pleas then filed, to take leave to file others within sixty days; after that time
the courts are still very liberal in admitting further pleas to be filed, provided the
cause is not thereby delayed, nor the opposite party taken by surprise; but the
leave of the court must always be btd.ined to enable thxq party offering them to
file pleas in this way." Idem, 467-468.
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that it can have no application to a defendant's right to file original, or initial, pleas.
As noted above, the literal language of the rule does not purport
to cover cases on the office judgment docket. Furthermore, the time
within which a plea, or pleas, may be filed to set aside an office
judgment would seem to be definitely defined by statute. A defendant has an absolute and positive legal right to plead to issue at
any time before the office judgment becomes final. This means
at any time during the next term of court after the office judgment has been entered, provided it has not been merged into a
judgment of court; and in a case wherein there is a writ of inquiry, at any subsequent term, up until the time when the writ of
inquiry is executed. At the next term after the office judgment has
been entered, even after it has been merged into a judgment of
court, the defendant still has a legal right to plead to issue, provided he complies with the proper statutory conditions and pleads before the end of the term.4 Pleas to issue, of course, are not confined to the general issue, but also include affirmative pleas in
' W. VA. CODE, C. 125, §§ 46, 47. "An office judgment is not a very serious
matter, if proper steps are taken to vacate it. No terms or conditions whatever
are imposed upon the defendant as the price of vacating it except that he shall
plead to issue and shall filesuch plea before the judgment becomes final by mere
operation of law. No consent of the court, or of anyone else, is necessary to filing of
such a plea. It is a matter of right". BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 275.

"A defendant in an office judgment can not be compelled by the court to
The court may sound the docket (that is,
plead until he chooses to do so.
call it) for the purpose of ascertaining if any pleas are to be filed, and the defendant may, at his election, either say nothing or announce his intention to
plead at a subsequent day, but the court can neither compel him to plead then, nor
fix a day when he shall plead. He is within his legal rights if he pleads to issue
at any time before the judgment becomes final. Up to this period he is master of
the situation." Idem, 277.
The language above sets out the clear import of the West Virginia statute
and is supported by the West Virginia decisions. Walls v. Zufall & Co., 61 W,
Va. 166, 56 S. E. 179 (1906); Snyder v. Cochran, 80 W. Va. 252, 92 S. E. 347
(1917).
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bar.' Hence a rule of court which would restrict a defendant to
the general issue, under such circumstances, would deny him his
statutory right. And of course, so long as the defendant is permitted to file affirmative pleas, the plaintiff must be given a reasonable opportunity to file affirmative replications. Any rule of court
which would undertake to limit the defendant's right to file initial
pleas, where an office judgment has been entered, would put it
within the power of the court, in effect, to abrogate the statutory
period within which an office judgment becomes final. If he should
have no defence to make under the general issue, it would be an
empty privilege to permit him to file the general issue in order
to set aside an office judgment and at the same time to deny him the
right to file an affirmative plea to issue setting up the only legitimate defense which he may have. The effect would be to make an
office judgment final before the expiration of the term, in dirct contradiction of the statute.
The plain purpose of such a rule is to obviate delay. A plaintiff
should expect to meet the general issue, but he may be surprised
by a special plea filed in court and compelled to ask for a continuance in order to prepare himself with proof. Indeed the five days
contemplated by the rule would in many cases offer a plaintiff insufficient time within which to prepare to meet an unexpected issue.
A special plea filed in court' to set aside an office judgment may
cause as much surprise and lead to as much delay as a plea filed
after an issue is made up. There is strong argument to the effect
that an office judgment ought to become final at rules. At the
3 While Mr. Barton 'says that the right to plead to issue is not absolute, It
should be noted that he concedes to the court only the right to inquire into the
good faith of the pleader as a condition precedent, and not the power to impose an arbitrary and indiscriminate time limit upon the privilege of pleading
In general.
"The law, it -will be observed, gave permission to plead to issue, and upon that
peculiar phraseology the authorities determined that the right to set aside an office
judgment by plea is not absolute. The conclusion reached upon the kind of plea
sufficient for the purpose was this: it must be issuable (including in the class
a plea of the statute of limitations), though a plea which requires subsequent pleadIngs to make up the issue has also been admitted. It must go to the merits of
the action, and must not be of a nature merely calculated for delay; and although the plea on its face contains a legal defence, yet, if it conclude with a verification, and the defendant act in such a manner as to show obviously that his
design is only to produce embarrassment or delay, the court may, for this cause,
reject or strike out the plea. This authority was not as definite in its nature as
was desirable, but it served to cause the Circuit Courts to establish various rules
by which they test the bona fides
of the party offering the plea; and if there
was reason to suppose that a party is not acting in good faith, but only intends
to cause delay, the courts were clearly justified In applying some test by which this
might be determined. A common way has been to require an affidavit from the
party that he had a good defence, or a statement from his counsel that if the information given, him by his client be correct, it. in his opinion, constituted a good and
valid defence."

BARTON,

LAW PRAcTicBE,

485.
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least, both defendants and plaintiffs might very justly be required
to show cause why one month is not sufficient time within which to
plead. The fact that an attorney is busy or indolent, or the fact
that a party plans unwarranted delay, may lead to more pleading
in court than do the legitimate demands of litigation. A remedy,
if desirable, must be sought in legislative enactment.
-L. C.

LiABILTY OF A TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO AN ADDRESS FOR NoN-DE-

OR FAILURE TO DE vER.-There is, perhaps, no legal
problem in which the true basis of recovery is more
controverted than that of the liability of a telegraph
company to an addressee. Where there has been an error in transmission recovery may be supported as grounded in
tort.' For non-delivery or delay in delivery, however, no principle
has been agreed upon. In England, although no case on this
latter point has been found, relief has been denied in cases of negligent transmission on grounds that would preclude recovery in
cases of delay or non-delivery.2 In America, however, almost universally the addressee is allowed recovery on some theory or other.3
One class of cases suggests that the sender makes the contract
with the telegraph company as agent for a disclosed principal, the
addressee. 4 Such a theory may be resorted to where the sender
acts primarily in the interests of the addressee.' In the ordinary
case, however, where he acts for himself or for a third party, such
an agency cannot be implied except as a legal fiction unwarranted
by the facts.0
Another group of cases treats the addressee as the beneficiary of
a contract between the sender and the telegraph company, and, on
the doctrine that a third party beneficiary to a contract may sue on
it, is allowed to recover in an action ex contractu.7 But this is
LIVERY

I

See POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON

LAW, 47. See also 14 HARV. L. REV. 193, n. 1.
- Playford v. United Kingdom Electric Tel. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 706 (1869) ; Dickson V. Reuter's Tel. Co., 3 C. P. D. 1 (1877).
See also JONEs, TELE3 For a collection of cases see 30 L. R. A. (N. s.)1121.
GRAPH AND TELEPHONE COmPANIES, 2 ed., 604.
(N.
Y. 1866) ; Western
1
Daly
547
Tel.
Co.,
etc.
4 De Rutte v. New York
Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton. 52 Ind. 1 (1875) ; western Union Tel. Co. v. Heathcoat, 47
So. 139 (Ala. 1908) ; Ford v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 124 Ala. 400, 27 So. 409
(1900).
r See WYMN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 349.
6 Ford v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., supra.
7 Frazier v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 Ore. 414. 78 Pac. 330 (1904) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. 857 (1889). See 18 HARV. L. REV.
234.
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